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CREATION AND TEMPORALITY IN
MEDIEVAL JEWISH PHILOSOPHY
T. M. Rudavsky

Of the many philosophical perplexities facing medieval Jewish thinkers,
perhaps none has been as challenging or as divisive as determining whether
the universe is created or eternal. Not unlike contemporary cosmologists
who worry about the first instant of creation of the universe, or Christian
scholastics who attempted to define the nature of an instant, so too
medieval Jewish thinkers were aware of the philosophical complexities surrounding the issues of creation and time. Jews were immensely affected by
Scripture and in particular by the creation account found in Genesis I-IT. In
the context of this tension, perhaps the most important word of Scripture is
b'reishit, "in the beginning." The very term b'reishit designates the fact that
there was a beginning, i.e., temporality has been introduced if only in the
weakest sense that this creative act occupies a period of time. In this paper
I shall focus my study upon Jewish philosophical attempts to clarify what is
entailed by postulating a first instant of creation. I shall begin with early
Rabbinical commentaries upon Genesis, and then turn to three paradigmatic
medieval Jewish thinkers who, influenced by these Rabbinical texts, represent the range of positions taken with respect to this issue.

1. Introduction
Of the many philosophical perplexities facing medieval Jewish thinkers,
perhaps none has been as challenging or as divisive as determining
whether the universe is created or eternal. Not unlike contemporary cosmologists who worry about the first instant of creation of the universe, or
Christian scholastics who attempted to define the nature of an instant, so
too medieval Jewish thinkers were aware of the philosophical complexities
surrounding the issues of creation and time. No Jewish philosopher
denied the centrality of the doctrine of creation to Jewish dogma. Jews
were immensely affected by Scripture and in particular by the creation
account found in Genesis I-II. But like their Christian and Moslem peers,
Jewish thinkers did not always agree upon what qualifies as an acceptable
model of creation. In particular, medieval Jewish philosophers writing on
creation were influenced by Aristotle's model of an eternally existing
world. When trying to prove that the world was created by God in time,
philosophers who wanted to support a biblical theory of creation in time
had to reject Aristotle's position that time is infinite. For if, as Aristotle
claimed, time is the measure of motion, and motion is of material stuff,
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then infinite time implies the eternity of the universe. But inasmuch as
accepting the eternity of the universe qualifies the role God plays in determining the act and materials of creation, Jewish thinkers were motivated to
reject the Aristotelian characterization of time while at the same time continuing to accept his overall philosophical authority.
In the context of this tension, perhaps the most important word of
Scripture is b'reishit, "in the beginning". The very term b'reishit designates
the fact that there was a beginning, i.e. temporality has been introduced if
only in the weakest sense that this creative act occupies a period of time. 1
In this paper I shall focus my study upon Jewish philosophical attempts to
clarify what is entailed by postulating a first instant of creation. I shall
begin with early Rabbinical commentaries upon Genesis, and then turn to
three paradigmatic medieval Jewish thinkers who, influenced by these
Rabbinical texts, represent the range of positions taken with respect to this
issue.
II. Rabbinical Reflections upon Creation

Not surprisingly, early Rabbinical texts evince earnest grappling with
the scriptural account of creation. Rabbinical sayings find their way into
the philosophical corpus early on. Although the Rabbis were not technically philosophers, they nevertheless raised many questions which were
incorporated into philosophical discussions. 2 One question addressed by
the earliest commentators was whether the universe was created ex nihilo
or out of a pre-existent reality. That the first statement in Genesis could be
read to support a theory of pre-existent formless matter was recognized
early on by the Rabbis. 3 According to one Rabbinical dictum the word
b'reishit refers to the fact that before the actual creation there pre-existed a
number of things. Numerous Rabbinical texts suggest that the presently
existing world came into being after a series of worlds that had been created and destroyed: 4
1.1 Seven things were created before the world, viz. the Torah,
repentance, the Garden of Eden, Gehenna, the Throne of Glory, the
Temple, and the name of the Messiah.'
1.2 Six things came before the creation of the world, some created,
some at least considered as candidates for creation ... "
1.3 He has come to receive the Torah, answered He to them. Said
they to Him: 'That secret treasure, which has been hidden by Thee
for nine hundred and seventy-four generations before the world was
created. 17
1.4 It is taught: R. Simeon the Pious said: These are the nine hundred
and seventy four generations who pressed themselves forward to be
created before the world was created, but were not created.'

460

Faith and Philosophy

The Rabbis clearly had no religious compunctions against suggesting
that our world did not represent the first creative effort on the part of God;
rather, they emphasized that entire worlds or generations pre-existed the
creation of the universe. This interpretation would explain the emptiness
and void (tohu va-vohu) which appeared to exist already when God initiated its original creative act. Rashi, for example, along with many other
Rabbis, interpreted the first two sentences of Genesis as meaning that
"when God created the heavens and earth, the earth was (already) empty
and void (tohu va-vohu), and darkness (hoshekh) was upon the face of the
deep."9 The explicit implication of this reading is that God created the universe out of a pre-existing tohu, vohu and hoshekh. This pre-existent stuff
was the result of at least one prior world.
With the postulation of pre-existent materials of creation, these texts
therefore raise the difficult and tantalizing question of whether time itself
pre-existed creation. In the following passage, it is suggested that time
could have existed before the existence of the universe: "Said R. Tanhuma,
The world was created at the proper time. The world was not ready to be
created prior to this time.'''lo One way to understand the phrase "prior to
this time" is to posit the eternity of time. That is, introducing a temporal
indicator to talk about the time when the world was created itself suggests
that time antedated creation. But other Rabbis claim that time was created:
"Rab Judah further said that Rab said: 'Ten things were created the first
day, and they are as follows: heaven and earth, Tohu, Bohu, light and
darkness, wind and water, the measure of day and the measure of
night.'''1l Inasmuch as light and darkness, and the measure of day and
night represent temporal markers, they come to represent, on the basis of
this passage, the creation of time.
The similarity of these passages to Plato's Timaeus is striking and did not
go unnoticed by later Jewish thinkers. In fact, as we shall see, medieval
Jewish philosophers were able to capitalize upon these similarities in order
to emphasize the harmonization of Scripture and Greek philosophy. Like
the Rabbis, Plato too worried whether the existence of the universe at a
time implied the creation of time itself. Within the panoply of ancient
Greek cosmologists, Plato is the first to identify time with the movement of
the heavens. In his cosmological text the Timaeus Plato defines time as "an
eternal likeness moving according to number - that to which we have
given the name Time."12 This everlasting likeness is of the Living Being
which is itself eternal. To this Living Being Plato attributes the domain of
"is", while "was" and "shall be" are "forms of Time that have come to
be."B With respect to the thorny question of whether time was created
along with the heavens or whether it pre-existed creation, Plato offers multiple responses, which have led scholars to postulate multiple interpretations of the text.' I For example in 38B Plato clearly suggests that time has
come into being with the heavens. Other passages, however, suggest that
time already existed prior to the creation of the heavens, giving rise to the
notion of a primordial disorderly time. It is not clear, therefore, whether
Plato ultimately adhered to one or two types of time. What is clear,
though, is that created time measures the circular motion of the heavenly
spheres. The sun, moon, and planets were "made to define and preserve
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the numbers of Time."15 The periods of time - the day, month and yearare the basic units of measurement which cannot exist without the motions
of the celestial bodies, the heavenly clock as it were. Neither time nor the
celestial bodies can exist without the other.
What we have then is a striking confluence of themes in both the
Timaeus and in Genesis. Both texts postulate the existence of a creator. Both
impute to this creator the urge to create, the willful choosing to bring the
universe into existence. Both recognize the importance of temporality in
this creation process: the scriptural author(s) by focusing on the importance of the term "day"(yom) in the creation account, and Plato by introducing time as the ontological divide between the superlunar and sublunar
spheres. And finally, both accounts allow for the possibility of creation
occurring out of a "pre-existent matter," a chaotic, formless stuff upon
which order is imposed. 16 These similarities will playa crucial role in subsequent Jewish discussions of creation, for they allow thinkers such as
Albo, and possibly even Maimonides, to reconcile a scriptural account of
creation with a philosophically minded account without undermining their
religious presuppositions.

III. The First Instant of Creation
We see, then, that the early Rabbis were aware of many issues surrounding creation, including the creation or eternity of time itself. These
issues are reiterated throughout Jewish medieval philosophical literature.
In part because of the introduction of Greek and Arabic texts, medieval
works reveal a marked increase in interest in cosmology in general.
Scholars have been careful to distinguish philosophical cosmology, which
includes discussion of creation, from astronomy. Comprised primarily of
natural philosophers and physicists, cosmologists followed Aristotle rather
than Ptolemy in their quest to offer a theory of the universe as an ordered
whole. 17 The formative classical texts included Aristotle's De Caelo ,supplemented by relevant passages from the Metaphysics, Physics and De
Generatione et Corruptione. Both Plato's Timaeus as well as commentaries
upon Genesis presented an additional dimension to this corpus.
Jewish texts in the early ninth - twelfth centuries reflect a strong
Neoplatonic influence. In addition, the Islamic school known as Kalam permeated Jewish philosophical writing. By the time of Maimonides in the
twelfth century, Jewish philosophers have to a large extent adopted an
Aristotelian framework according to which reality is a continuous plenum
in which time and matter are infinitely divisible. More specifically,
Aristotle posits an eternal universe in which time is potentially, if not actually, infinite; neither time nor the universe was created. Jewish philosophers, however, who almost without exception are committed to the belief
that God created the universe, must grapple with the implications of
Aristotle's eternity thesis with respect to Scriptural theories of creation. For
example, in light of the first verses of Genesis, they must determine whether
this universe was created simultaneous with or subsequent to the creation
of time. Furthermore, they must analyze the significance of the term
b'reishit in the context of an Aristotelian theory of time. The writings of
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Saadiah Gaon, Maimonides and Joseph Albo, to which we now turn, attest
to this tension.
Writing in tenth century Egypt (882-942), Saadiah Gaon incorporated
Kalam influences into his major philosophical work Emunot ve-Deot (The
Book of Doctrines and Beliefs).lB The ostensible purpose of this work is to
show that the truths of scientific inquiry can be reconciled with the tradition of Torah; to this end he examines a series of philosophical conundra,
many of which are drawn from Kalam writings. In the chapter on creation
Saadiah presents eight arguments for the creation of the world which can
be divided into two groups of four arguments each: the first group proves
that the world must be finite (i.e. not eternal), and the second group that
the world was created ex nihilo and not out of a pre-existent matter.
Although Saadiah does not mention John Philoponus by name, it is
clear that he draws from John Philoponus' argument that the infinite cannot be traversed. 19 Jolm Philoponus' major work Contra Aristotelem has
been lost and survives only in quotations from Simplicius' commentaries
on Aristotle's De Caelo and Physics. 20 In this work, Philoponus hopes to
demonstrate the creation of the world by arguing that Aristotle's assumption of eternal motion leads to impossible implications. Philoponus' works
were known to Arabic philosophers, and were transmitted by the Kalam
school, through Saadiah Gaon, to eleventh and twelfth century Jewish and
Christian philosophers. 21 For this reason his arguments are of crucial
importance to later medieval attempts to refute Aristotle's arguments for
the eternity of the universe.
In his arguments, Philoponus takes Aristotle's definition of the infinite
(which Aristotle used to prove eternity) and turns it against itself, showing
that in fact it precludes eternity. The three specific arguments offered by
Philoponus can be summarized briefly as follows:
2.1. If the universe were eternal, the generation of any object in the

sublunar universe would be preceded by an infinite series of generation. But an infinite cannot be traversed, and so no objects would be
generated.
2.2. The eternity of the universe would imply an infinite number of

past motions that is continually being increased. But an infinite cannot be added to.
2.3. The numbers of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies are multiples of one another and thus eternity would imply infinite numbers
of past motions in varying multiplicities. But infinite numbers cannot be multiplied. 22
In Contra Aristotelem Philoponus presents two sets of arguments in support of creation, both of which are directed against Aristotle's eternity thesis. According to Simplicius he assumes as axiomatic that "it is impossible
for an infinite number to exist in actuality or for anyone to traverse the infinite in counting and that it is also impossible that anything should be
greater than the infinite, or that the infinite should be increased."21 From
this axiom he argues as follows. Imagine an infinite series of transforma-
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tions which has taken place among the four elements. In an eternal world,
these transformations would constitute an infinite series. But, using
Aristotle's characterization of infinity, it is clear than an infinite number
cannot exist actually or be traversed. So in an eternal world, the infinite
series of transformations could never be completed and the particle now
known to exist could never in fact have come into existence. "If then, the
motion of the particular fire came to be, an infinite number of motions
surely did not exist first."24 Further, imagine that the scenario were
expanded to the spheres. If the motion of the heavens is without a beginning, and if spheres revolve at unequal periods of revolution, then it is necessary that the sphere of Saturn has rotated with an infinite number of revolutions; but on this celestial model the sphere of Jupiter must have rotated
with nearly three times more revolutions, the sun with thirty times more
revolutions than Saturn, and that of the fixed stars more than ten thousand
times greater. But, Philoponus, argues, "if it is not <even> possible to traverse the infinite once, is it not beyond all absurdity to assume ten thousand times the infinite, or rather the infinite an infinite number of times?"25
Hence he concludes that the circular motion of the heavens is not eternal
but must have had a beginning.
Now whether Philoponus' insights can be upheld as philosophically
cogent in light of modern understandings of infinity (not to speak of heliocentrism itself) is doubtful. As Sorabji has argued, Philoponus has not
demonstrably shown that the universe must have had a beginning. In fact,
it is unlikely that this thesis can ever be supported with the absolute certainty required by Aristotelian demonstration. 26 But I agree with Sorabji
that the importance of Philoponus' arguments lie in their providing
medieval Jewish and Christian philosophers with the ammunition they so
desperately needed to refute the eternity thesis. 27 It is precisely this ammunition which Saadiah utilizes in his support of creation ex nihilo.
Saadiah Gaon's fourth proof of creation "from time" draws upon John
Philoponus' first proof of creation and is based on Philoponus' premise
(2.1) that no infinite can be traversed. The argument proceeds as follows:
3.1 We know that time is threefold: past, present, and future.
3.2 Although the present is shorter than any instant, let us take the

instant as one takes a point.
3.3 By (2.1) above, we know that it is not possible to traverse the infinite.
3.4 If we assume that time is infinite, it is "impossible for thought to

penetrate to the furthest point of that which is infinite."
3.5 Hence if an individual should try in his thought to ascend from
that present point in time to the "uppermost points", it would be
impossible for him to do so.
3.6 On the same reasoning it is impossible that the process of genera-
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tion should traverse an infinite period down to the lowest point so as
ultimately to reach us.
3.7 But if the process of generation did not reach us, we would not be
generated, and the beings now existent would not be existent.
3.8 However I find myself existent.

3.9 I therefore know that the process of generation has traversed time
until it has reached me.
3.10 We therefore conclude that time must be finite. 28

Having argued that (3.9)-proof of the traversal of past time-supports
his postulating the finitude of time, Saadiah then applies the argument to
the traversal of future time as well. But he fully recognizes that (3.3) need
further examination. It is in the context of supporting (3.3) that Saadiah
raises a possible objection to the argument. Saadiah attributes to an anonymous heretic a variation of Zeno's celebrated paradoxes of motion: 29
3.11 The following objection has been made by "a certain heretic in
conversation with one of the Believers in the Unity of God."
3.12 We know that any distance which an individual walks can be
"divided into an infinite number of parts."
3.13 But we also know that an individual can in fact cover the distance between these two points.
3.14 Therefore it is possible to traverse an infinite distance. 3D

In Saadiah's statement of Zeno's paradox, the heretic claims that inasmuch as any distance is infinitely divisible, the fact that a person can travel
from one point to another demonstrates that the infinite can be traversed.
In other words, (3.14) contravenes (2.1) and hence (3.3) must be rejected.
How, then, can Saadiah account for (3.14), traversing an infinite distance,
without abandoning his argument for the finitude of time? Aristotle's original solution was that the individual has an infinite amount of time in
which to traverse the infinitely divisible distance in question. Saadiah,
however, is more interested in Kalam solutions to the problem according to
which one might apply the notion of the leap, or atomism. The Kalam
philosopher al-Nazzam, for example, introduced the notion of the leap as a
response to Zeno. 31 Believing in infinite divisibility, but eschewing atomism, he adopted the idea of infinitely divisible leaps in order to explain
how we can traverse an infinity of sub-distances. On this theory any journey involves a finite number of variably short leaps.32
Rejecting this Kalam theory as untenable, Saadiah proposes his own
solution which is a reflection of Aristotle's distinction between actual and
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potential infinity. According to Aristotle, Zeno had confused two senses of
indivisibility: a complete divided state as opposed to the process itself of
dividing. The first Aristotle terms actual infinity, and the latter he terms
potential infinity. Aristotle then argues that a solution to Zeno's paradoxes
relies upon this latter sense of infinity: because infinite divisibility is a continuing process, the potency in question is thus actualized whenever the
process is in effect. 33 This distinction between actual and potential infinity,
mediated through the works of John Philoponus, is reflected in Saadiah's
discussion?' Saadiah argues that Zeno's paradox is sophistical in that it
fails to note that lithe infinite divisibility of a thing is only a matter of imagination (mahshavah), but not a matter of reality (po' al)."35 If, Saadiah argues,
the infinite traversal had occurred in the past in the imagination alone, the
paradox would be valid. But since the process of generation has traversed
real time and reached us, (3.12) "cannot invalidate our proof, because infinite divisibility exists only in the imagination."36 In answer to this paradox,
then, Saadiah distinguishes between actual and potential traversal.
Traversing a finite spatial distance is not the same as traversing infinity,
because in this case there is no actual infinity, but only an infinitely divisible finite distance. That is, reminiscent of Aristotle's distinction, Saadiah's
point is that the infinite exists potentially and not actually.
Aristotle had shown that a spatial magnitude is potentially infinite by
division, meaning that it can be divided infinitely not in actuality but in
potentiality; so too are number and time potentially infinite by addition,
meaning that units of number and time can be infinitely added to a numerical or temporal sequence, not in actuality but in potentiality. For Aristotle
this category of potential existence, as expressed by potential infinity
(either by way of addition or division), is critical to his positing the eternity
of the universe. 37 Saadiah accepts the Aristotelian idea of a potentially infinite divisibility but minimizes its significance. 3R The key to John
Philoponus' argument was that the infinite cannot be traversed and the
same is true in Saadiah's argument. But as Davidson points out,
Philoponus and Saadiah differ on one important point. Philoponus was
determined to provide a beginning instant not only for the sublunar realm
but for the celestial domain as well; his denial of an infinite series of transformations on the sublunar realm had to apply equally to the celestial
realm in which transformations do not occur. Saadiah, on the other hand,
did not distinguish so sharply between the sublunar and celestial domains
and so was able to concentrate upon a simpler consideration of traversal of
a temporal series. 39 For Philoponus, therefore, the infinite refers to an infinite series of discrete units, whereas the infinite for Saadiah is construed as
an infinite time continuum which is not reducible to discrete parts. This
move simplifies the argument considerably for Saadiah.
But did Saadiah even recognize the difference between an infinite series
and infinite continuum? Evidently not, for otherwise he would not have
moved so seamlessly between time and space. As Davidson points out,
Saadiah's response to this paradox is that the objection misleadingly
adduces the traversing not of an 'actually' existing infinite, but of an infinite existing solely in 'imagination', whereas the actual proof relies on the
fact that an actual infinite cannot be traversed.") That is, the objection

466

Faith and Philosophy

views distance not as an infinite continuum, but rather as an infinite series
of discrete parts. By accepting the cogency of the objection, apparently
Saadiah did not detect any distinction between the two:' For Saadiah,
then, Philoponus' arguments pertaining to traversing an infinite distance
enabled him to support the creation thesis in a way which accorded with
Scripture.
Similar considerations occur in the thought of Moses Maimonides (11351204), whose philosophical writings, especially The Guide of the Perplexed,
represent some of the most far-reaching and influential Jewish philosophical work to this very day."2 Maimonides is unequivocal with respect to the
purpose of the Guide, namely to dispel the perplexity of that individual
who, steeped in the fundamentals of his religious system, nevertheless has
encountered philosophical precepts which threaten to undermine his religious beliefs. The reconciliation of rational speCUlation and religious belief,
philosophy and religion, comes to be the desideratum of this work. Of the
many topics which demand reconciliation, the doctrine of creation is possibly the most intractable. To deny the creation of the universe on the part of
the Deity threatens the entire fabric of Jewish belief, including belief in miracles, divine providence, and human freedom; on the other hand, to subscribe to the standardly accepted Jewish view of creation in time threatens
belief in the scientific underpinnings of reality represented by Aristotle's
corpus. Maimonides' analysis of creation and its relevance to cosmology
occurs in two works, in Mishneh Torah III-IV and Guide 1:72 and 11:19-24.
These two sets of texts present what recent scholars have considered to be
conflicting cosmological accounts. Unraveling the source of conflict in
these texts will enable us to determine more fully Maimonides' theory of
creation.
The Mishneh Torah is a compilation of the entire oral law, including both
the Mishnah and the Talmud, and is intended for a general, non-philosophical audience. 43 In this work Maimonides offers a description of the universe which captures elements of the current Ptolemaic cosmology: the
spheres are organized in an orderly fashion, with no vacuum obtaining
between spheres; epicycles are introduced to account for variation in revolution; and spheres are endowed with intelligible souls responsible for
their orderly motion."' And yet, what complicates matters is that
Maimonides offers a decidedly anti-Ptolemaic account in the Guide which
appears incompatible with the Mishneh Torah account. The question, then,
is whether Maimonides believes that the presentation given in the Mishneh
Torah or in the Guide more accurately reflects a true account of the origin
and nature of the universe.
Because the account presented in the Guide follows Aristotle's philosophical cosmology more closely than that of Ptolemy, I shall briefly summarize the relevant features of this cosmology. In the Aristotelian cosmology, the universe is a finite sphere whose center is at the earth. Nine primary concentric spheres (in turn divided into subsidiary spheres) rotate
around the earth; these spheres form a compact whole with no vacuum.
The superlunar heavens differ in composition from the sublunar bodies in
that the former are composed of a single incorruptible element, aether,
while the earth is comprised of the four elements. The ultimate source of
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motion in this system is God, or the unmoved first mover:5 But did God
move the first moving sphere as an active, efficient cause, or as a passive,
final cause? In attributing to all the celestial spheres a mover, the ultimate
source of motion being God, Aristotle subsequently argued that there
must be a plurality of spheres to account for the motion of each planet. In
speculating upon the motion of the spheres, Aristotle reflects the Platonic
view that time is inherent in the cyclical movement of the celestial spheres.
If this movement of the spheres did not exist, there would be no time.
Aristotle claims in a number of texts that time is defined in terms of motion
and so there can be no time without motion. 46 On Aristotle's model, then,
there was a series of concentric nested orbs, each moving in a nahlral, uniform, circular motion, all sharing the earth as a common center.47
In Guide 1.72 Maimonides presents a cosmological scheme which, while
reflecting basic features of Aristotle's account, nevertheless shares as well
some affinities with the Ptolemaic picture found in Mishneh Torah. This
cosmological picture is then amplified in Guide 11:19-24. Maimonides
argues, following Aristotle, that both the matter and the form of the
spheres differ from that of the four elements, as reflected in the different
types of motion exhibited by them. But he then points to several problems
with Aristotle's attempts to explain why the sphere moves from the East
and not from the West, and why some spheres move faster than others.
Maimonides rejects Aristotle's explanations on the grounds that "the science of astronomy was not in his [Aristotle's] time what it is today."48
Having rejected Aristotle's analysis, Maimonides presents his own version in Guide 11.24. His main thesis is that the underlying premise of
Ptolemy'S Almagest, namely that "everything depends on two principles;
either that of the epicycles or that of the eccentric spheres or on both of
them,"49 is untenable. Maimonides' own contention is that these two principles are "entirely outside the bounds of reasoning and opposed to all that
has been made clear in natural science."sn In other words, Maimonides
rejects Ptolemaic astronomy on the grounds that it conflicts with
Aristotelian physics. The first principle is rejected on the grounds that the
existence of epicycles implies that that the "epicycle rolls and changes its
place completely," hence undermining the Aristotelian dictum that things
in the heavens are immovable. 51 He then offers other considerations, in the
name of Abu Bakr, against accepting the doctrine of epicycles.52
Following this analysis, Maimonides presents the following theoretical
perplexity:
If what Aristotle has stated with regard to natural science is true,
there are no epicycles or eccentric circles and everything revolves
round the center of the earth. But in that case how can the various
motions of the stars come about? Is it in any way possible that
motion should be on the one hand circular, uniform, and perfect, and
that on the other hand the things that are observable should be
observed in consequence of it, unless this be accounted for by making
use of one of the two principles, or of both of them? This consideration is all the stronger because of the fact that if one accepts everything stated by Ptolemy concerning the epicycle of the moon and its
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deviation toward a point outside the center of the world and also outside the center of the eccentric circle, it will be found that what is calculated on the hypothesis of the two principles is not at fault by even
a minute .. This is the true perplexity.53
That Maimonides characterizes an astronomical conundrum as the "true
perplexity" in a work whose raison d'etre is devoted to defusing perplexities has not escaped scholars.54 Does Maimonides really mean to suggest
that the perplexities engendered by a religious individual who is introduced to philosophy are crystallized by difficulties pertaining to astronomy? Maimonides responds to this perplexity by defining the function of
the astronomer in a way which suggests that in his view the heavens cannot ultimately be configured by humans. 55 But the underlying implication
of the Mishneh Torah is that the heavens can be configured; in fact we saw
that Maimonides himself gave such a configuration. If the Mishneh Torah
represents the absolute codification of physical and metaphysical truth,
what do we make of his account in the Guide?56 In answer to this question,
Kellner for one has argued that the Mishneh Torah "does not represent the
most perfect possible exposition of that science available to him and most
certainly does not represent the highest stage that astronomy can reach."57
On this reading the Mishneh Torah represents the conventional Ptolemaic
wisdom of the time, as contrasted with the anti-Ptolemaic account given in
the Guide.
But underlying this query lies a deeper concern, namely whether
Maimonides really believes that the heavens can be configured. The
description provided in Mishneh Torah would imply that human beings
can have the sort of astronomical sophistication required to achieve knowledge of the celestial order; on the other hand, several key passages appear
to undercut these implications. If it is not possible to achieve such knowledge, what does that say about our understanding of creation itself?
My own reading is an amplification of Langermann's point that, in contradistinction to implicit suggestions in 11.24, Maimonides does regard the
true configuration of the heavens as something humanly attainable. 58 On
this reading, Maimonides' point is epistemological rather than ontological:
it is not that the heavenly spheres are per se inaccessible to the human intellect, but rather that nobody yet has determined their true configuration. 59
The key passages for this interpretation are (4.1) and (4.2), both of which
emphasize the epistemological, not the ontological, limits of human intellect:
4.1. To fatigue the mind with matters that "cannot be grasped by
them" is a defect in one's inborn disposition.
4.2. It is possible that somebody else may "find a demonstration by
means of which the true reality of what is obscure for me will become
clear to him."60
(4.1) warns against pushing human intellect beyond its dispositional
limits; and (4.2) suggests that it is not inconceivable that some mind may
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find a demonstration of these matters. In other words, there is nothing in
the nature of the heavenly configurations per se which precludes their
being known. That is, there is nothing in the science of astronomy which is
per se beyond human grasp.
If that is so, the relevant implications to Maimonides' theory of creation
are clear. Already in his Introduction to the Guide, Maimonides had listed
the doctrine of creation as a subject so dangerous that it should be discussed only within the company of one individual. Maimonides' own discussion of creation is intentionally fraught with ambiguity and equivocity.
As a result, interpretation of these chapters has become among the most
hotly contested enterprise in recent Maimonidean studies. Scholarly readings have ranged from regarding Maimonides as a pious follower of
Jewish belief, to a closet heretic adhering to Aristotelian eternity, to a skeptic whose true view espouses the inherent limitations imposed upon the
human intellect in these matters.
In other papers I have argued that one key to reading Maimonides'
views on creation lies in his theory of time. 61 Without going into the details
of this argument, suffice it to say here that in Guide II, in the context of his
discussion of creation, Maimonides argues that "God's bringing the world
into existence does not have a temporal beginning, for time is one of the
created things."62 Maimonides does not want to suggest that time itself is
eternal, for "if you affirm as true the existence of time prior to the world,
you are necessarily bound to believe in the eternity [of the world]."63 But
neither will he claim that the creation of the world is a temporally specifiable action, for the world, on the Aristotelian definition of time, must be
beginningless in the sense that it has no temporal beginning. Clearly then
the temporal specificity of creation plays a critical role in Maimonides' theory.
This last point is emphasized in Maimonides' commentary on the word
b'reishit. What does Scripture mean by saying that "In the beginning God
created ... "? In order to explain the sense of beginning' being used in this
context, Maimonides turns in Guide II.30 to an interpretation of the two
terms tehilah and reishit, both of which mean "start" or 'beginning". As
Klein-Braslavy has pointed out, Maimonides distinguishes between the
two on the basis of causal priority.64 While the term tehilah implies causal
beginning, the term reishit refers not to a temporal priority of one event to
another, but rather to its ontological genesis. o5 In other words, temporal
anteriority is not the same as causal anteriority. On this basis Maimonides
is able to allow for an interpretation of the word b'reishit in such a way as
to accord with eternal creation. The b' prefix in the word b'reishit is not, on
this reading, a temporal indicator, but rather fixes the event in question
ontologically: it refers not to a temporal beginning but to an underlying
ontological state; So that when we read the phrase in Genesis I.l ("b'reishit
barah elohim" = "in the beginning God created"), we should understand it
to describe a nontemporal event, one which specifies that God is the creator of the universe, that is, its ontological ground of Being.
How then does Maimonides interpret those rabbis who understood the
Creation account in Genesis to postulate a domain of temporality before the
creation event? For example, how there can be 'one day', at the beginning
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of creation, when the temporal indicators, i.e. sun and moon, were not created until the fourth day? In II.30 Maimonides quotes two Rabbinic
authorities, Judah ben Simon and Abahu, both of whom suggest that "time
existed prior to the existence of this sun."66 Recognizing that their statements support an eternity thesis, Maimonides adopts two separate strategies. The first is simply to admit that their comments imply that "the order
of time necessarily exists eternally a parte ante. That, however, is the belief
in the eternity a parte ante of the world, and all who adhere to the Law
should reject it."67 Maimonides' second strategy is to subsume their comments as corollaries of those of Rabbi Eliezer. In 11.13 Maimonides refers to
Rabbi Eliezer, whose commentary on creation postulates creation by
means of pre-existent matter. Maimonides depicts this commentary as
admitting "the eternity of the world, if only as it is conceived according to
Plato's opinion."68 Without rejecting either of these statements,
Maimonides claims that their comments are "only the counterpart of the
passage in which Rabbi Eliezer says, 'Wherefrom were the heavens created./I'69 Inasmuch as Maimonides is not bothered by the implications of the
latter, so too can it be inferred that he is not bothered by the former. In this
way Maimonides has opened the interpretative door to subsequent Jewish
philosophers who will use Rabbi Eliezer's words to support a theory of
pre-existent matter.
One such philosopher is Joseph Albo (d. 1444), who represents the intellectual bridge between the medieval and modem philosophical world. The
author of Sefer Ikkarim [Book of Principles], Albo incorporated Maimonides'
discussion of pre-existent matter into his own examination of creation,
which is couched in the context of developing a theory of time. He is one
of the first Jewish philosophers to espouse the view that time is a phenomenon of the imagination, a motif introduced by Crescas and recurring in
Spinoza. Alba's discussion of time occurs in the context of demonstrating
that God is independent of time. For Albo, God's independence of time
comprises both eternity (ha-kadmut) and perpetuity (ha-nitzhiyyut) and is
upheld as a basic principle:70
The third dogma is that God is independent of time. This means that
God existed before time, and will exist after time ceases, therefore His
power is infinite. For everyone who is dependent upon time is necessarily limited in power, which ends with time. Since, therefore God
is not dependent upon time, His power is infinite. 71
That God is prior to all existing things, including time, was a commonplace of Aristotelian thought. But inasmuch as this view was not held by
his teacher Crescas, [who argued that time is independent of the physical
world and had existed prior to it], so Albo must be ready to explain to
Crescas' followers his own position vis a vis primordial time.72 By God's
priority Albo means that nothing was prior to God, not even non-existence;
God has always existed "in the same way without change."73 Similarly
God's eternality means that nothing is posterior to God, not even time. For
if time outlasted God either a parte ante or a parte post, then God would exist
at one instant of time and not at another; this, of course, would undermine
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God's necessary existence.
These comments lead Albo to examine the nature of time and creation
more closely. God's eternality holds, he claims,
even if by time we mean unmeasured duration (hameshekh habilti
meshoar) conceived only in thought, existing always, both before the
creation of the world and after its cessation, but without the order
apparent from the motion of the sphere, since the sphere was then
neither in motion nor existent. 74
Only measured time cannot exist without motion. Time itself, according
to Albo is not dependent upon motion and even preexisted the world.
This non-Aristotelian motif is developed more fully. In another context
Albo compares the commandments to time inasmuch as both time and
commandments are not actual existents (bilti nimtzaim be'poal) :
[just as] time is not an actual existent, for the past is no longer here,
the future is not yet, and the present is merely the now which binds
the past to the future. The now itself is not real time (zeman al derech
ha-emet), since it is not divisible, whereas time is divisible, pertaining
as it does to continuous quantity (hacamah hamitdabek). The now is
related to time as the point is related to the line. Time is therefore not
an actual existent, and yet it gives perfection of existence to all things
existing in time?5
Albo then distinguishes between "plain time" and "the order of time" as
follows:
Our Rabbis are of the opinion that time in the abstract (ha-zeman beshilluah) is such a duration. Time measured or numbered through
the motion of the sphere they call "order of times" (seder zemanim),
not simply time (zeman s'tam). According to this there are two species
of time, the one is numbered and measured by the motion of the
sphere, to which are applicable the terms prior and posterior, equal
and unequal. The other is not numbered or measured but is a duration (hemshekh) existing prior to the sphere, to which the words equal
and unequal do not apply. 76
Whereas plain time is neither numbered nor measured, the order of
times is numbered and measured by the motion of the diurnal sphere. In
contrast to ordered time, plain time is eternal duration. Albo then raises
two perplexities pertaining to time. The first puzzle is whether time originates in time or not. The solution is that although time has no origin and
does not come to be in time, the "order of time" originates in time." The
second puzzle concerns the instant: "The now (ha-'atah), it is said, divides
the past from the future. There is therefore a time before the first now, and
hence time and the sphere are eternal."7R Albo's answer, relying on his
two-fold notion of time, is that Aristotle's argument refers only to the
"order of times" and not to "plain time"; plain time in which there is no
motion "has not the elements prior and posterior, and it is not subject to
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measure because measure cannot apply to time without motion. The terms
prior and posterior apply to it [plain time] only figuratively and loosely." 79
To Rabbi Judah ben Simon's related dictum that the order of time pre-existed creation, Albo is quick to point out that Rabbi Judah really meant that
the time which is measured by the motion of the sphere is called "order of
times" and is contrasted to time simply (hazeman be-shilluah) which has no
priority, posteriority, or order. 8o
But Albo recognizes that ultimately this solution does not resolve the
issue. Quoting the famous Rabbinic passage that one must not explore
what is above, below, before and behind, Albo accedes that he has not really explained "how there can be a duration before the creation of the world
which has in it neither prior nor posterior."B! Or as Harvey has succinctly
argued, Albo has not succeeded in explaining how, within the "order of
times", there can be a first instant which has no ''before.''82

IV. Conclusion
In his rich and comprehensive study "Time in Judaism," Steensgaard
has stated that because medieval Jewish philosophy was primarily derivative, "it makes little sense to search for [the concept of time] among the
Jewish philosophers of religion of the Middle Ages."i\3 Nothing, however,
could be further from the truth. That medieval Jewish philosophers were
influenced by speculative schools at critical points in their history has
rarely, if ever, been contested by scholars. But to reject the ideas of Jewish
philosophers as merely derivative and not worthy of study is to ignore the
creativity which can arise out of cultural and philosophical influences. In
contradistinction to Steensgaard, I have attempted in this paper to demonstrate that medieval Jewish discussions of creation reflect a complexity
which is nuanced by the subtle interweaving of biblical, Rabbinical and
Greek philosophical traditions.
This subtle interweaving has given rise to a sophisticated literature
which focuses upon the very first instant of creation. Not surprisingly,
early Jewish writings disagree over how best to interpret Genesis I. Some
rabbis attest to the pre-existence of matter, time, and entire generations,
while others insist that nothing pre-existed the creation of our world.
These early Rabbinical writings are incorporated into medieval Jewish discussions of creation and time. By the twelfth century, I have suggested
that Jewish philosophers are working with a conception of creation and
time drawn clearly from Aristotelian sources. Questions of infinite divisibility, omniscience, eternity, and temporal order abound. Saadiah Gaon
reflects the Kalam preoccupation with traversal of an infinite series, a preoccupation which can be traced back to Zeno's paradoxes of motion. Saadiah
uses the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite to demonstrate that
the universe must have had a first temporal instant.
We have seen that Maimonides is sympathetic to an Aristotelian theory
of time. And yet much of his effort has been aimed at showing that the
Scriptural view of creation is inconsistent with this theory. Maimonides is
unwilling to support Aristotle's denial of creation altogether, however. His
own view, then, is a version of eternal creation according to which an eter-

CREATION AND TEMPORALITY

473

nally existing world has been sustained by a Creator, but not in a temporal
context. In the sense that there is no one instant in which the world is
brought into existence, it is eternal; in the sense, however, that God is the
ontological ground of the world, it is created. Albo, on the other hand,
introduces into Jewish thought the distinction between 'plain time' which
is unmeasured, and 'order of time' which is measured by the motion of the
celestial spheres. Hearkening back to Plotinus, Albo allows for the introduction of an imaginary realm to time which is independent of physical
motion of the diurnal spheres.
Ultimately what is at stake for all these thinkers is how to reconcile disparate models of creation and temporality. My initial suggestion was that
accepting Aristotle's eternity thesis of the universe, represented in this context by the infinity of time, required serious modifications on the part of
theologically minded thinkers committed to a belief in an efficacious Deity.
Unlike Saadiah Gaon who eschewed eternity altogether, both Maimonides
and Albo introduce elements of eternity into their philosophical cosmology. Unwilling to reject the possibility of infinite time, they have both incorporated the idea of pre-existent time into their cosmology. However, they
have managed to maintain the efficacy of a creator Deity, thus retaining the
creation paradigm presented in Scripture. Like the early Rabbis, they have
demonstrated that the "gates of interpretation are never closed," that
Scriptural texts and traditions can be deconstructed to accomodate competing philosophical models. Let me suggest in closing that Judaism's contribution to philosophical theology ultimately lies in the the creativity of this
interpretative process.
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